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This is 
Appellant D. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
a rehearing on the appeal of Defendant-
John Musselman from a denial by the District 
Court of Mr. Musselman's motion to set aside a default and 
default judgment entered against him in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION 
The court below, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, pre-
siding, entered its order denying Mr. Musselman's motion to 
set aside the default and default judgment. This Honorable 
Court issued an opinion on July 26, 1982 affirming the 
District Court. On October 8, 1982 this Court granted 
Mr. Musselman' s Petition for Rehearing. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Musselman seeks a reversal of the District 
Court's denial of his motion to set aside the default and 
default judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In order to fully understand the issues presented on 
this appeal, it is essential to set forth the underlying 
facts which preceded and resulted in the Default Judgment 
against Mr. Musselman. 
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In April, 1977, Linda Ann Coram, one of the named 
defendants in this action, sought treatment from a medical 
doctor in Nephi, Utah, for a severe skin rash. After an 
office visit and a brief physical examination, the physician 
prescribed a series of drugs commonly referred to as steroid 
drugs. 
After two to three weeks of treatment, Mrs. Coram 
developed severe stomach pains and internal bleeding. 
During the last week of April, 1977, Mrs. Coram was hospi-
talized at the Juab County Hospital where she remained fer 
approximately one week. During that week, her physician, 
who had prescribed the steroids, failed to perceive the 
nature of her medical condition. On or about April 29, 
1977, Mrs. Coram was transferred to the Utah Valley Hospital 
in Provo, Utah, under the care of other physicians, where 
she underwent surgery shortly thereafter. Two large peptic 
ulcers were discovered in her stomach. 
As a result of the ulcers and related problems, 
Mrs. Coram remained in critical condition through the 
remainder of the year 1977. She underwent several major 
surgeries and spent substantial time in an intensive care 
unit. (See generally, Record on Appeal, hereinafter "R.," 
pp. 41- 4 2 , 4 7 . ) 
The professional medical opinion was that Mrs. Coram's 
initial physician was negligent in administering the steroid 
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treatments and in failing to timely and properly diagnose 
her medical condition. 
Pursuant to the Medical Assistance Act (the former 
Title 55, Chapter 15a, Utah Code Ann.) the State of Utah 
undertook to pay various medical costs and expenses for 
Mrs. Coram' s care. All of the disbursements made by the 
State of Utah on behalf of Mrs. Coram were made directly to 
various heal th care providers and were paid prior to the 
effective date of the Medical Benefits Recovery Act. 
During the fall of 1977, Mrs. Coram contacted appel-
lant, D. John Musselman, an attorney, and retained him to 
represent her in a medical malpractice lawsuit. 
Mr. Musselman commenced a medical malpractice action on 
behalf of Mrs. Coram in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah in October, 1978. 
Mr. Musselman subsequently corresponded with the Utah 
State Department of Recovery Services and informed the 
Department that an action had been conunenced. Mr. Musselman 
requested information on any amounts paid by the State and 
to whom, and whether or not the State intended to make any 
claim for reimbursement. (R., p. 40.) The Department of 
Recovery Services responded in a letter from an employee of 
the Department, providing the requested information and 
simply stating that the State of Utah intended to make a 
claim for subrogation. No further communications of any 
nature, however, were received from the State, nor did the 
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State ever become a party to Mrs. Coram's action. The State 
never filed any verified lien with the United States 
District Court as required by the Medical Benefits Recovery 
Act (at that time codified as §55-15d-10, Utah Code Ann.). 
In February, 1981, Mrs. Coram' s claim was settled for 
the sum of $150,000.00. This sum did not adequately compen-
sate Mrs. Coram for the life-threatening and permanent 
injuries that she suffered. Nevertheless, insurance limita-
tions effectively mandated settlement for the $150, 000. 00. 
( R. , pp. 42- 4 3 , 4 7 -48 . ) 
Ninety thousand ($90,000) dollars of the settlement 
proceeds were disbursed to Mrs. Coram, out of which she paid 
her attorney's fees and costs. The sum of $60,000 was 
retained by Mr. Musselman at the request of and for the 
benefit of Mrs. Coram pending resolution of the potential 
claim of subrogation by the State. The $60,000 was held and 
secured by Mr. Musselman pursuant to the express wishes and 
direction of Mrs. Coram. 
In June, 1981, the State of Utah filed the present 
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County against Mrs. Coram and Mr. Musselman. (R., pp. 2-5.) 
The complaint asserted two causes of action. The ''First 
Cause of Action" alleged a claim for subrogation against 
Mrs. Coram in the amount of $82, 522. 22. The "Second Cause 
of Action," abandoned by the State and not a part of this 
appeal, alleged an alternative claim against Mr. Musselman 
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under a breach of contract of representation theory. The 
summons and complaint were served upon Mr. Musselman, but, 
curiously, were never served upon Mrs. Coram and she is not 
a party to these proceedings. 
During the month of June, 1981, Mr. Musselman conferred 
by telephone with the attorney for the State concerning the 
lawsuit and possibilities of settlement. On approximately 
June 29, 1981 .. however, Mr. Musselman was admitted to the 
Utah Valley Hospital at Provo, Utah, on an emergency basis 
with a severe stomach ailment. Mr. Musselman remained in 
the Utah Valley Hospital for approximately one week, during 
which time various medical procedures were performed and 
during which time Mr. Musselman remained under medication 
and heavy sedation for pain. (R., pp. 26-27, and medical 
records and affidavit appended to the original Brief of 
Appellant as Appendices A and B.) 
During the several days following his release from the 
hospital and during his convalescence at home, Mr. Musselman 
attempted to contact Mr. Halgren, the attorney for the 
State, in order to inform him of the untimely medical 
emergency and the reason that the complaint remained unan-
swered. On July 13, 1981, Mr. Musselman did in fact reach 
Mr. Halgren's secretary and waited on the line for approxi-
mately 9 minutes in an attempt to speak with Mr. Halgren. 
Without returning Mr. Musselman's call, Mr. Halgren, on the 
next day, July 14, 1981, entered a Default Judgment against 
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Mr. Musselman. On the same day, Mr. Musselman was finally 
able to speak to Mr. Halgren on the telephone, but was 
informed by Mr. Halgren that a Default Judgment had already 
been entered. (R., pp. 26-27, Transcript of Novernber3, 
1981 hearing, pp. 13-14.) 
The Default Judgment was entered against Mr. Musselman 
only on the "First Cause of Action" of the complaint. The 
''Second Cause of Action'' of the complaint does not form a 
part of the Default Judgment. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Subsequent to entry of the Default Judgment, 
Mr. Musselman timely filed, on August 13, 1981, his Motion 
to Set Aside Judgment (R., p. 32). Concurrently with his 
motion to set aside, Mr. Musselman filed his affidavit and 
tendered a proposed answer to the complaint (R., pp. 26-31). 
The motion to set aside was originally noticed for 
hearing on August 18, 1981, but the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, 
presiding, declined to hear the motion on that date, and the 
motion was instead continued and heard on November 3, 1981, 
again with the Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding. After 
both sides had presented arguments which related chiefly to 
the issue of excusable neglect, the lower court ruled from 
the bench, stating that, in its opinion, the proposed answer 
did not set forth a defense (Transcript of November 3, 1981 
-6-
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hearing, pp. 20-21). 
was therefore denied. 
The motion to set aside the default 
This was the only ground stated for 
the lower court's ruling, and thus, the finding of excusable 
neglect must be inferred. The lower court entered its 
formal order on November 18, 1981 (R., p. 87) and 
Mr. Musselman appealed to this Court on December 10, 1981 
(R., p. 90). 
This Honorable Court rendered its initial opinion on 
July 26, 1982, affirming the lower court and holding that 
Mr. Musselman had not tendered a meritorious defense. On 
August 30, 1982, Mr. Musselman petitioned this Court for a 
rehearing on the basis that controlling facts assumed by 
this Court in support of its initial ruling were not admit-
ted or conceded by Mr. Musselman and on the basis that 
plaintiff had failed to state any claim for relief against 
Mr. Musselman. This Court granted Mr. Musselman's Petition 
for Rehearing on October 8, 1982. Mr. Musselman therefore 
submits this Brief on Rehearing. 
GENERAL ISSUES PRESENTED 
There are two issues to resolve in determining whether 
or not the Default Judgment against Mr. Musselman should be 
set aside. Those issues are: (1) was Mr. Musselman's 
conduct in failing to timely answer excusable; and (2) did 
Mr. Musselman tender a meritorious defense to the complaint? 
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In the first paragraph of its initial opinion, this 
Honorable Court set forth Mr. Musselman's basic contention 
with respect to his right to have the Default Judgment set 
aside due to excusable neglect. Mr. Musselman, at the time 
of the entry of default, had only a few days before been 
released as an inpatient from the Utah Valley Hospital, and 
was at home convalescing pursuant to the direction of his 
treating physician. As more fully set forth below, both the 
lower court and this Court implicitly held Mr. Musselman's 
conduct to be excusable. 
Therefore, the only issue remaining for decision is 
whether or not Mr. Musselman in his tendered answer prof-
fered a meritorious defense to the "First Cause of Action" 
of plaintiff's complaint, 
entered. 
upon which the default was 
This Honorable Court affirmed the lower court's denial 
of Mr. Musselman's motion to set aside the default on the 
basis of controlling facts set forth in the second paragraph 
of the Court's opinion rendered July 26, 1982. In that 
opinion, the Court assumed that Mr. Musselman had admitted a 
right of subrogation in favor of the plaintiff pursuant to 
the Medical Benefits Recovery Act as well as a right of 
subrogation pursuant to a written assignment executed by 
Mrs. Coram. 
-8-
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Neither of these two controlling facts are admitted or 
conceded by Mr. Musselman, nor are they supported by the 
record. 
This Court's initial opinion also indicated that the 
Court was under the impression that Mr. Musselman had agreed 
to represent or act on behalf of the State. As more fully 
explained below" no such agreement is to be found in the 
record, nor was such an agreement even pled by the State 
anywhere in the claim upon which the Default Judgment was 
based. Inasmuch as the assumed facts which controlled this 
Court's initial decision are disputed and at issue, it is 
apparent that Mr. Musselman' s tendered answer sets forth 
several meritorious defenses to plaintiff's complaint. This 
brief focuses primarily on these defenses. Mr. Musselman's 
motion to set aside is well taken and he must be given his 
day in court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT MUSSELMAN HAS TENDERED SEVERAL MERITORIOUS 
DEFENSES TO THE CLAIM UPON WHICH THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
ENTERED AGAINST HIM PERSONALLY WAS BASED 
The central issue for determination on this appeal is 
whether Mr. Musselman proffered any "defense of at least 
ostensible merit as would justify a trial" with respect to 
the claim upon which the Default Judgment against him 
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personally was entered. Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney 
Corp . , 5 4 5 P . 2 d 5 0 7 , at 510 (Utah , 19 7 6 ) . 
It has previously been noted above, and is readily 
apparent from the District Court record, that the Default 
Judgment was taken only on plaintiff's ''First Cause of 
Action" (the claimed right of subrogation) and not upon the 
"Second Cause of Action. " The "First Cause of Act ion'' 
alleges an obligation of $82, 522. 22 and contains a prayer 
for $82,522.22. The "Second Cause of Action," on the other 
hand" contains a prayer for damages of $61,891.66, plus 
punitive damages in the amount of $25,000.00. The Default 
Judgment makes no reference to any of the specific sums 
prayed for in the ''Second Cause of Action." On its face, it 
is clear the Default Judgment was entered only on the ''First 
Cause of Action" for the exact amount prayed in the sum of 
l $82,522.22. 
1Indeed, had the Default Judgment been entered on the 
"Second Cause of Action," summary reversal would have been 
mandated. In Security Adjustment Bureau,. Inc. v. West, 20 
U.2d 292, 437 P.2d 214 (1968), this Court held that it was 
error for the District Court to award punitive damages 
without proof. This error in and of itself justified 
vacating the de:fendant' s default in that case. In this 
case, the record reveals no evidentiary hearing or findings 
of fact. This Court's holding in Security Adjustment Bureau 
would require setting aside any default based on the State's 
"Second Cause of Action.'' 
-10-
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A. Plaintiff's "First Cause of Action'' Fails To 
State Any Claim for Relief Against Mr. Musselman 
1. No Claim with Respect 
to Mr. Musselman is Even 
Asserted 
In substance, the State alleges in its "First Cause of 
Action" as follows: (1) Mrs. Coram received Medicaid 
assistance from the State; (2) Mrs. Coram made a written 
assignment of benefits to the State; (3) the Medical 
Benefits Recovery Act provides for subrogation rights; (4) 
Mr. Musselman was retained by Mrs. Coram as her attorney in 
a medical malpractice action; (5) the defendants failed to 
comply with certain notice provisions of the Medical 
Benefits Recovery Act; (6) the State gave written notice to 
the defendants of its alleged lien rights; (7) Mrs. Coram 
settled her medical malpractice action without the consent 
of the State; (8) Mr. Musselman placed $60,000.00 of the 
settlement funds into a separate account and disbursed the 
balance; and (9) there was no attorney-client contract 
between the State and Mr. Musselman (R., pp. 2-5). 
These allegations may suggest a possible claim for 
relief against Mrs. Coram, but do not state any claim 
against Mr. Musselman. The first four paragraphs make no 
mention of Mr. Musselman other than that he was retained by 
Mrs. Coram. 
Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 allege only that Mrs. Coram, 
through Mr. Musselman, failed to comply with certain notice 
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and consent provisions set forth in the Medical Benefits 
Recovery Act. Mr. Musselman' s tendered answer not only 
denies these specific allegations, but, moreover, even 
assuming that the State could establish such disputed 
allegations as to notice and consent, those allegations do 
not form the basis of any claim against Mr. Musselman. 
Paragraph 9 alleges that no contract of representation 
existed between the State and Mr. Musselman. Such an 
allegation certainly does not form the basis of any claim 
for relief against Mr. Musselman. Interestingly, al though 
the State in this paragraph specifically alleges that there 
was no contract of representation between the State and 
Mr. Musselman, plaintiff asserted at some length in its 
initial brief to this Court that Mr. Musselman had agreed to 
represent the State and that he had admitted to such an 
arrangement. On that basis, this Court stated in its 
initial opinion that Mr. Musselman had "agreed to honor and 
assist" in asserting plaintiff's alleged subrogation claim. 
Such an alleged representation agreement, however, is 
not only without support in the record, but was not even 
pled by plaintiff anywhere in the claim upon which the 
Default Judgment was based. Indeed, in paragraph 9, plain-
tiff pleads directly to the contrary. Mr. Musselman has 
nowhere conceded and does not now concede that any such 
representation agreement existed. 
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The only other paragraph that makes any reference to 
Mr. Musselman is paragraph 8. Paragraph 8 alleges that 
Mr. Musselman gave ''notice by telephone to 
that he had placed Sixty Thousand Dollars 
said settlement funds in his trust 
the department 
($60\000.00) of 
account. 
,, 
Mr. Musselman admits giving such notice. Mr. Musselman did 
indeed place such funds in trust for his client ~rs. Coram. 
The fact that Mr. Musselman placed funds in trust for his 
client, however, cannot form the basis of any claim for 
relief against Mr. Musselman. 
Plaintiff's ''First Cause of Action" thus pleads essen-
tially only that Mr. Musselman was counsel for Mrs. Coram in 
a medical malpractice suit, that he effected a settlement 
for the injuries which Mrs. Coram had sustained, that he 
held $60,000.00 of Mrs. Coram's settlement funds in trust, 
and that the State alleges a lien on Mrs. Coram's settlement 
funds based on a claimed right of subrogation. Nothing in 
these allegations states any claim against Mr. Musselman 
upon which any relief may be granted. 
By taking the Default Judgment against Mr. Musselman on 
its ''First Cause of Action," the State contends that 
Mr. Musselman is somehow personally liable for a potential 
claim which the State may have but has never attempted to 
assert against his client Mrs. Coram. Such a theory is 
obviously without merit and has no support in the law. 
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2. Mr. Musselman Acted Only 
as an Attorney for Mrs. Coram, 
and Thus No Judgment can be had 
Against Mr. Musselman Personally 
From the very allegations of plaintiff's complaint, it 
is clear that the relationship of Mr. Musselman to 
Mrs. Coram was one of attorney-client and trustee-
beneficiary. It is elementary law that an attorney or 
trustee has no primary personal obligation for the debts of 
the client or beneficiary. See, e.g., Davis v. Ciancio, 172 
Colo. 54, 470 P.2d 30 (1970) and Moran v. Loeffler-Greene 
Supply Co ... 316 P.2d 132 (Okl., 1957). 
Therefore, with respect to any debts of Mrs. Coram, the 
liability of Mr. Musselman is limited to those assets held 
by him in trust for Mrs. Coram. His liability, as Mrs. 
Coram's attorney, is not and cannot be primary, and a 
judgment therefore cannot be had against him personally for 
any debt or obligation of Mrs. Coram. If the State had 
obtained a judgment against Mrs. Coram, any assets of 
Mrs. Coram held by Mr. Musselman could presumably be 
garnished or attached under proper procedure. See, 
Annotation, ''Funds in Hands of His Attorney as Subject of 
Attachment or Garnishment by Client's Creditor,'' 35 A.L.R.3d 
1094. The State has not followed any such procedure, and, 
moreover, has not even sought a judgment against Mrs. Coram. 
Indeed, the State has not even served or attempted to serve 
Mrs. Coram in this action. 
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B. Plaintiff Has No Right of Subrogation under the 
Medical Benefits Recovery Act 
1. Plaintiff Cannot Assert 
Any Right of Subrogation or 
Any Lien Based on the 
Medical Benefits Recovery 
Act Inasmuch as the Act is 
Not Retroactive 
The Medical Benefits Recovery Act, upon which plaintiff 
pleads its "First Cause of Action", was enacted in 1979. 
Utah Code Ann., §§55-15d-l et.~-, recodified at Utah Code 
Ann., §§26-19-1, et. ~· All benefits paid by the State 
had~ however, been paid prior to the effective date of the 
Medical Benefits Recovery Act. 
The Medical Benefits Recovery Act contains no clause 
making the statute retroactive to benefits paid before its 
effective date. Under §68-3-3, Utah Code Ann., which codi-
fies well-established rules of construction, a statute is 
not retroactive unless expressly so declared. The Medical 
Benefits Recovery Act contains no such declaration or 
clause, and thus it cannot apply to the benefits paid on 
behalf of Mrs. Coram. 
2. No Statutory Subrogation 
Claim May Be Asserted Because the 
Statute of Limitations Has Run 
Even if the State could assert a claim under the 
Medical Benefits Recovery Act, the Act, by its own terms, 
limits any action brought thereunder as follows: 
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Any action brought under this chapter shall 
be commenced within two years on employee 
benefits pian[s] and four vears on all other 
plans after the date of injury or onset of 
the illness or six months after the date of 
the last medical payment, whichever is later. 
Section 55-15d-9(1), recodified at §26-19-8(1), Utah Code 
Ann. [emphasis added]. 
Plaintiff's complaint filed on June 1, 1981 is, by its 
terms, an action under the Medical Benefits Recovery Act. 
The last payments made on behalf of Mrs. Coram were made 
well in excess of six months prior to the filing date of the 
State's complaint. Moreover, the date of injury or onset of 
illness for Mrs. Coram was prior to the end of April, 1977. 
The complaint in this action was therefore filed more than 
four years ''after the date of injury or onset of the 
illness." 
In short, the statute of limitations had run prior to 
the filing of the complaint. 
3. Plaintiff Failed to 
Follow the Prescribed 
Statutory Procedure to 
Perfect a Lien Necessary to 
Assert a Subrogation Claim 
In the "Fourth Defense'' of his tendered answer, 
Mr. Musselman asserted that the plaintiff failed to comply 
with prescribed statutory notice and filing requirements 
contained in the Medical Benefits Recovery Act. Thus, even 
if the State could assert a claim under the Medical Benefits 
Recovery Act, the State failed to perfect any lien under the 
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Act. Absent a perfected lien, the State has no claim of 
subrogation: 
When a cause of action has been instituted in 
court by a beneficiary, the state's lien 
shall be perfected by its filing with the 
court a verified lien statement ... 
Section 55-15d-10(2), recodified at §26-19-9(2), Utah Code 
Ann. [emphasis added]. No verified lien statement was ever 
filed with the court. See the Affidavit of Paul L. Badger~ 
Clerk of the United States District Court for the District 
of Utah, a copy of which is appended to the original Brief 
of Appellant as Appendix C. 
4. The State has Not 
Pursued the Remedy 
Prescribed by the Statute 
on which it Bases its Claim 
The Medical Benefits Recovery Act, upon which the 
State's "First Cause of Action" is predicated, provides the 
procedure for the State to enforce a subrogation claim: 
55-15d-10. (1) Any amount paid by the State 
of Utah on behalf of a beneficiary as medical 
assistance shall become a lien against any 
cause of action, recovery, settlement, 
judgment, award, or claim of a beneficiary 
against any liable third party or carrier. 
( 2) When a cause of action has been insti-
tuted in court by a beneficiary, the State's 
lien shall be perfected by its filing with 
the court a verified lien statement. 
55-15d-12. (1) When the department has 
perfected a lien upon a judgment in favor of 
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a beneficiary against any third party or 
carrier for an injury or illness for which 
the beneficiary has received benefits, the 
department is entitled to execute upon the 
judgment as a lien claimant, in the same 
manner as if it were a named party to the 
original judgment, . . . 
(2) In the event the amount of the judgment 
or settlement so recovered has been paid to 
the beneficiary, the department shall be 
entitled to a writ of execution against the 
beneficiary to the extent of the department's 
lien, with interest and other accruing costs 
as in the case of other executions. 
[emphasis added] 
Thus, plaintiff's remedy to enforce a claim of subroga-
ti on would have been to obtain a writ of execution after 
perfecting a lien in the original action brought by 
Mrs. Coram. Plaintiff cannot now follow this procedure, 
however, because no verified lien statement was ever filed 
and, therefore, no lien was ever perfected. As set forth in 
the "Fifth Defense" of Mr. Musselman's tendered answer, the 
plaintiff has failed to follow required statutory procedure 
and cannot pursue the claims asserted in its "First Cause of 
Action.'' 
5. Plaintiff Has Failed 
to Adjust the Total 
Amount of its Claim as 
Required by Statute 
In the "Third Defense" of his tendered answer, 
Mr. Musselman points out that plaintiff's maximum recovery 
is limited according to the formula set forth in the Act: 
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Where the action is brought by the bene-
ficiary alone, and the beneficiary incurs a 
personal liability to pay attorney's fees and 
costs of litigation, the department's claim 
for reimbursement of the benefits provided to 
the beneficiarv shall be limited to the 
amount of the medical expenditures_JEr the 
benefit of the beneficiary less 25 percent, 
which percent represents the department's 
reasonable share of attorney's fees paid by 
the beneficiary~ and less that portion of the 
cost of litigation expenses determined by 
multiplying the cost of litigation expenses 
by the ratio of the full amount of expendi-
tures over the full amount of the judgment, 
award, or settlement. 
Section 55-15d-8(4), recodified at §26-19-7(4), Utah Code 
Ann. [emphasis added]. 
The State alleges that a total of $82,522.22 in medical 
bills were paid on behalf of Mrs. Coram. No adjustment of 
25 percent or of the proportional cost of litigation as 
required by §55-15d-8(4) was made. The plain~iff not only 
erroneously claims that full amount, but took Default 
Judgment for that amount. 
6. Plaintiff Has No Right of 
Subrogation Because Mrs. Coram 
Has Not Been Made Whole 
The ''Sixth Defense" of Mr. Musselman' s tendered answer 
asserts that plaintiff is not entitled to any recovery 
because Mrs. Coram was not made whole and was not fully 
compensated for her injuries. It is a well-established 
principle of law that an injured party is entitled to be 
made whole before any benefits received by the injured party 
are subject to any claim of subrogation. This principle was 
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succinctly stated by this Court in Transamerica Insurance 
Co . v . Barnes , 2 9 U . 2 d 10 1 , 5 0 5 P . 2 d 7 8 3 ( 19 7 2 ) : 
Equitable principles apply to subrogation, 
and the insured is entitled to be made whole 
before the insurer may recover any portion of 
the recovery from the tortfeasor. 
505 P.2d at 786 [emphasis added]. The right of the injured 
party to first be made whole is likewise established in Lyon 
v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 25 U.2d 311, 480 
P.2d 739 (1971) and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie~ 606 P.2d 
1197 (Utah, 1980). 
Mrs. Coram was not made whole in the settlement of her 
medical malpractice claim. Thus, even if the State could 
assert a subrogation claim, a determination by the lower 
court would be necessary to fix the proper amount, if any, 
which the State could recover. 
C. Plaintiff Has No Right of Subrogation Based 
on Any Written Assignment and Could Not Assert 
Any Such Claim Against Mr. Musselman 
The only mention of an alleged written assignment of 
benefits in plaintiff's complaint is contained in paragraph 
2, where plaintiff simply asserts that Mrs. Coram made such 
an assignment. Though Mr. Musselman's tendered answer 
initially admitted paragraph 2, this response was made only 
because of the positive assurance by plaintiff's counsel 
that such an assignment existed and the promise by plain-
tiff's counsel to provide a copy thereof to Mr. Musselman. 
No such assignment was ever provided to Mr. Musselman or 
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to his counsel, although a copy has been requested on 
several occasions. 
1. Plaintiff Made No 
Claim Based on Any 
Written Assignment in Its 
''First Cause of Action" 
Even if such an assignment exists, plaintiff's 
complaint states no claim based thereon. The "First Cause 
of Action'' is based solely upon the claimed right of 
plaintiff to recover under the Medical Benefits Recovery 
Act, and the allegation of the existence of an assignment 
executed by Mrs. Coram is superfluous to the remaining 
allegations of the "First Cause of Action." It is 
elementary law that a default judgment cannot be upheld on 
the basis of a potential claim that was never pled. 
2. No Claim for Relief 
May Be Asserted Against 
Mr. Musselman on the Basis 
of an Assignment Executed 
by Mrs. Coram 
Even if the plaintiff's complaint were construed to 
contain a claim based upon a written assignment, such a 
claim is obviously not against Mr. Musselman. Such a claim 
could only be asserted against Mrs. Coram. No claim for 
relief is stated or can be stated against Mr. Musselman 
personally by virtue of an alleged assignment of benefits 
executed by Mrs. Coram. 
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3. A Claim of Subrogation 
Based on a Written Assignment 
is Likewise Barred on the 
Ground that Mrs. Coram Has 
Not Been Made Whole 
The well-established principle that an injured party is 
entitled to be made whole before any portion of a recovery 
is subject to any subrogation claim has been discussed 
above. This equitable principle bars any subrogation claim 
based on a written assignment until Mrs. Coram has been made 
whole. 
II. MR. MUSSEL"-1.~N'S SHOWING OF INADVERTENCE AND 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT IS UNCONTROVERTED AND HAS BEEN 
- ·-IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZED BY BOTH THIS COURT AND THE 
LOWER COURT 
Rule 60(b)(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the Court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
As expressed by this Court in Board of Education of Granite 
School District v. Cox, 14 U.2d 285, 384 P.2d 806 (1963): 
The courts will generally grant relief in 
doubtful cases so that a party may have a 
hearing. As the court stated in Warren v. 
Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741: 
''The allowance of a vacation of 
judgment is a creature of equity 
designed to relieve against 
harshness of enforcing a judgment, 
which may occur through procedural 
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difficulties~ the wrongs of the 
opposing party, or misfortunes 
which prevent the presentation of a 
claim or defense." 
384 P. 2d at 807 [emphasis added]. This Court went on to 
say: 
It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to 
vacate a default judgment where there is 
reasonable justification for the defendants' 
failure to appear and answer. 
384 P.2d at 807. This Court in Cox noted with approval the 
lower Court's setting aside of the default of Mrs. Cox due 
to illness. Serious illness is likewise the basis of 
excusable neglect in the present case. 
In Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin~ 14 U.2d 60, 377 P.2d 
189 (1962), this Court observed: 
Judgments by default are not favored by the 
courts nor are they in the interest of 
justice and fair play. The courts, in the 
interest of justice and fair play, favor, 
where possible a full and complete 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of 
every case. 
377 P. 2d at 190 [emphasis added]. In Mayhew v. Standard 
Gilsonite Co., 14 U.2d 52, 376 P.2d 951 (1962), this Court 
held: 
It is undoubtedly correct that the trial 
court is endowed with considerable latitude 
of discretion in granting or denying such 
motions [motions to set aside default 
judgments]. However, it is also true that 
the court cannot act arbitrarily in that 
regard, but should be generally indulgent 
toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge 
of disputes so they can be settled advisably 
and in conformity with law and justice. To 
clamp a judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a 
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~_ny without a hearing is obviously a harsh 
and oppressive thing. It is fundamental in 
our system of justice that each party to a 
controversy should be afforded an opportunity 
to present his side of the case. For that 
reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an 
abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a 
default judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear~ and timely application is 
made to set it aside. 
376 P.2d at 952 [emphasis added]. In accord: Westinghouse 
Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor~ Inc., 544 
P. 2d 8 7 6 (Utah 19 7 5). 
In this case, Mr. Musselman demonstrated through his 
affidavit to the district court (R., pp. 26-27) that his 
reason for not timely answering plaintiff's complaint was 
his sudden illness and subsequent hospitalization. Illness 
of the incapacitating nature and severity as is present 
here, requiring hospitalization for approximately a week and 
subsequent convales :ence at home, certainly constitutes a 
reasonable excuse for failure to appear and answer, at least 
until a reasonable recovery can be made. 
The lower court was quite specific in its ruling, 
denying Mr. Musselman's motion to set aside solely on the 
ground of failing to state a defense. (Transcript of 
November 3, 1981 hearing, pp. 20-21.) It is therefore 
implicit in the lower court's ruling that excusable neglect 
was shown. The lower Court would have had no reason to 
address the issue of a meritorious defense unless it 
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believed excusable neglect had already been established. 
Indeed, as this Court held in Cox: 
This latter question [that of a meritorious 
defense] arises only after consideration of 
the first question [that of excusable 
neglect] and a sufficient excuse therefrom 
being shown. 
384 P. 2d at 808. [emphasis added]. 
Similarly, there would have been no reason for this 
Court in its initial opinion to go beyond the question of 
excusable neglect had excusable neglect not been shown. No 
contradiction whatsoever is contained in the record as to 
Mr. Musselman' s serious illness, hos pit alizat ion, and his 
subsequent convalescence. Indeed, there could be none. 
Therefore, as the lower court and this Court in its initial 
op1n1on have implicitly held, Mr. Musselman's conduct 
necessarily constitutes excusable neglect, requiring that 
the default judgment be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The "First Cause of Action" of plaintiff's complaint, 
the sole basis upon which the Default Judgment is 
predicated, does not assert any claim against Mr. Musselman 
upon which any relief may be granted. Mr. Musselman, as 
Mrs. Coram' s attorney, has no primary personal obligation 
for any debt or obligation of his client or beneficiary, 
and, therefore no judgment may be had against Mr. Musselman 
personally. Plaintiff may not assert any claim under the 
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Medical Benefits Recovery Act, inasmuch as (1) the statute 
is not retroactive and did not take effect until after the 
last payment made on behalf of Mrs. Coram, and (2) the 
statute of limitations had run prior to the filing of 
plaintiff's complaint. Moreover, the State failed to follow 
the prescribed statutory procedure to perfect any lien, a 
prerequisite to any subrogation claim. Finally, the State 
has not pursued the proper remedy prescribed by the statute 
to enforce a subrogation claim. 
Mr. Musselman has demonstrated that plaintiff has 
failed to adjust its claim by the statutorily-required 
formula. Mr. Musselman has also shown that plaintiff has no 
subrogation claim, inasmuch as Mrs. Coram has not been made 
whole by the settlement. 
Plaintiff has not made any claim in its "First Cause of 
Action'' based on any written assignment. Even if there were 
such an assignment and even if the complaint were construed 
to include such a claim, no claim for relief against 
Mr. Mu~selman personally can be stated on the basis of such 
an assignment executed by Mrs. Coram. Moreover, a 
subrogation claim based on such a written assignment would 
be barred on the ground that Mrs. Coram has not been made 
whole. 
For each and all of these reasons, plaintiff's claim 
against Mr. Musselman fails either as a matter of law or as 
a result of substantive defenses proffered by Mr. Musselman. 
-26-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Default Judgment must not only be set aside, but an 
instruction should also be given to the lower court to 
dismiss plaintiff's "First Cause of Action'' as to 
Mr. Musselman. 
Mr. Musselman's showing of inadvertence and excusable 
neglect is uncontroverted and has been implicitly recognized 
by both this Court and the court below. 
The most fundamental and basic premise of our judicial 
system is that every man is entitled to his day in court 
where he can present his case to an impartial tribunal. 
Mr. Musselman has been denied that fundamental 
constitutional right. This Cour~ must right that wrong and 
set aside the Default Judgment against Mr. Musselman. 
1982. 
Respectfully submitted this _:]___ day of November, 
400 American Plaza II 
5 7 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-7751 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant D. John Musselman 
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two true and correct copies to their attorney, Leon Halgren, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this ~ day 
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